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CRIMINAL LAW-Effective Assistance of Counsel
After serving ten years of a life sentence for murder,
the petitioner was released by a federal district court on
a writ of habeas corpus. In Walker v. Broughl, the circuit
court upheld the writ stating that the petitioner, William
Walker, had been denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. The circuit court pointed out that
Walker was interrogated during his arraignment by the clerk
in open court. In response to direct questions, he twice pleaded
guilty. Because Walker was not represented by counsel, the
presiding judge ordered the plea stricken from the record.
However, after waiving the right to a jury, the defendant
Walker was found guilty by the same judge who had presided over his arraignment.2
Though the presiding judge had knowledge of the prior
plea of guilty, this information was not conveyed to Walker's
attorney. Furthermore, the docket did not show that the plea
had been entered and later stricken. Because of the attorney's
ignorance of the guilty plea, he was not in a position to
provide effective legal assistance to the defendant. Ordering
the defendant released under the writ of habeas corpus, the
court stated:
[WIe can only speculate as to what course of action
Walker's trial counsel would have pursued had he known
that his client had twice tendered a plea of guilty...
before the judge who was to determine the guilt or
innocence of his client. But it is inconceivable that a
competent defender, with full information of what had
transpired, would not immediately sense the possibility
of prejudice if the arraigning judge should try the case.
He would act to eliminate any such possibility.3
1 368 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 350-351. See Wood v. United States, 357 F.2d 425 (10th
Cir. 1966) (success is not the test for effective assistance
of counsel).
3 368 F.2d at 352. See McGill v. United States, 348 F.2d 791
2
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While the trial judge was not disqualified from presiding
at the trial simply because he had presided at the arraignment, Walker had an absolute right to remove his case to
another court, to ask for a different judge and to demand
a jury trial.4 His counsel's ignorance of what had happened
at the arraignment prevented him from exercising these
rights.
In White v. Marylands, the prisoner was without counsel when he was taken before a magistrate for a preliminary
hearing where he entered a plea of guilty to a murder charge.
At the trial this plea was introduced into evidence with no
objection being offered and the defendant was convicted of
murder. Reversing the decision, the United States Supreme
Court stated: "[W]e do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: 'only the presence of counsel could have enabled
this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to
plead intelligently'."6
In analyzing White v. Maryland, the district court stated:
"As we understand and construe the White case the conviction was not reversed solely on the ground that the accused
was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing."7 The court was referring to the fact that the trial
judges had knowledge of the defendant's prior guilty plea.
It was also observed that:
In the instant case the trial judge had first hand

4

5
6
7

(D.C. Cir. 1965) (the sixth amendment does not require the
presence of counsel at a point where there is not a reasonable
possibility of prejudice to the rights of the accused).
See Brack v. State, 187 Md. 542, 51 A.2d 171 (1947); Jones
v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946). The constitution
of Maryland gives an absolute right of removal in all cases
"on charges of capital crime." Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430,
157 A. 723 (1931).
373 U.S. 59 (1963).
Id. at 60. See United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601 (4th Cir.
1962).
368 F.2d at 353.
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knowledge of Walker's admission of guilt by the repeated tender of a guilty plea in the court's presence.
It cannot be logically argued that the trial court's personal knowledge of the admission of guilt is less likely
to be prejudicial than similar knowledge obtained by
the three judges of White through introduction of evidence at trial. The possibility of prejudice is as real in
one instance as in the other.8
The personal knowledge of the judge was the determining
factor-a factor that could possibly have had a detrimental
effect on the defendant's subsequent trial. The trial court,
looking strictly to the possibility of prejudice, refused to
determine if it had actually resulted. In determining that
a possibility of prejudice existed, the appellate court placed
itself in the position of defendant's counsel when it stated:
"We quickly conclude that the best interests of the accused
would prompt counsel to first obtain removal of the trial
to another court."9 The court then stated: "Upon removal,
if it appeared likely that the same judge would follow to
try the case, the next logical move would be to seek the
possible assignment of another judge ....

"10

The sixth amendment states that an accused shall "have
the assistance of counsel for his defense."11 This has been
construed to mean "effective assistance of counsel."12 Generally, the courts have been very strict in applying these
words. United States v. Malfettil3 required the representation
to make "a farce and mockery of justice" before an accused's
right had been violated. In Goforth v. United States,14 the
defendant had "effective representation" even though the
counsel was appointed only a few minutes before the trial.
8 Id.

9 Id. at 352. See Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).

10 368 F.2d at 352.

CONST. amend. VI.
Thomas v. District of Columbia, 90 F.2d 424, 428 (D.C. Cir.
1937); accord, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932).
125 F.Supp. 27, 30 (D.N.J. 1954).
314 F.2d 868, 871 (10th Cir. 1963).

11 U.S.
12
13
14

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1968

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 1, Art. 7
1968]

CRIMINAL LAW

Recent cases have been liberal in construing what is
effective assistance of counsel. Poe v. United States15 held
that when the defense is substantially weakened because of
unawareness on the part of deiense counsel of a rule of
law basic to the case, the defendant is not given effective
assistance of counsel. One thrust of recent cases has determined that if the effectiveness of legal assistance is likely
to be prejudiced by a prior denial of counsel at an earlier
proceeding, a conviction obtained in such circumstances is
invalid. An example of this idea was shown in Hamilton v.
Alabama.16 In Alabama, defensive maneuvers such as insanity are waived if not asserted at the arraignment. The
defendant in Hamilton, because of his lack of counsel at the
arraignment, did not know that he should introduce these
defenses. Therefore, the rights of this defendant were prejudiced and effective assistance of counsel at the trial was
an impossibility.
Walker v. Brough seems to be the most liberal case to
date in determining whether a defendant has been deprived
of effective assistance of counsel. A strong dissent argued
that the court should not be eager to set aside a murder
conviction almost ten years old. The dissent stated: "The
grounds given for Walker's release are too hypothetical and
tenuous to sustain a charge of Constitutional invalidity."17
The dissent went on to say: "The court rests wholly on its
speculation of what might have happened in the prosecution.
is counsel might have moved for a change of venue; he
might have asked for another judge; he might have asked
for a jury; or the judge might have been prejudiced." is
The dissent pointed to Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann:
If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to be
233 F.Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964).
368 U.S. 52 (1961).
368 F.2d at 354.
18 Id. at 353.
15
16
17
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set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden
of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him
who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result
set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of
speculation but as a demonstrable reality.19
It is apparent that in determining whether a defendant
has effective assistance of counsel the following questions
must be kept in mind.
1. Has the attorney had ample time to determine a
reasonable course of defending the accused and to
prepare a valid defense?
2. Does the attorney have knowledge of all matters
concerning the case against the accused? If not,
whose fault is it that such knowledge is not known
by the attorney? Will such lack of knowledge possibly prejudice the rights of the accused?
Upon reviewing Walker v. Brough an important question
should be raised - how far will the courts go in protecting the accused's rights to effect assistance of counsel?
The courts at the present time are creating new ways to
safeguard individual's rights, and the Walker case appears
to represent a new approach. Walker v. Brough seems to
be in line with the liberal trend established by the United
States Supreme Court in criminal cases but as to whether
it goes beyond remains to be seen.
Benjamin P. Abney

19 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
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